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Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Arave v. Creech,1 the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a statutory aggravating circumstance to be
considered by Idaho judges in capital cases. In accordance with its
jurisprudence in this area, the Court did not examine the circum-
stance on its face, which allowed the death penalty to be imposed if
the murderer exhibited "utter disregard for human life." Rather,
the Court considered the Idaho Supreme Court's "narrowing con-
struction," which, the Court found, applied the "utter disregard"
aggravating circumstance exclusively to "cold-blooded pitiless
slayer[s]." 2 The Court held that this narrowing construction of the
aggravating circumstance both sufficiently channeled the sentencing
judge's discretion and genuinely narrowed the class of persons eligi-
ble for capital punishment and therefore precluded arbitrary and ca-
pricious administration of the death penalty. 3 Hence, the Idaho
statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. 4
This Note examines the development of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence concerning sentencer discretion in state capital sen-
tencing schemes. This Note argues that, in Arave, the Supreme
Court took the unprecedented step of further channeling a state's
narrowing construction of an aggravating circumstance and, as a re-
sult, approved an aggravating circumstance that provides less gui-
dance to a sentencer than any previously validated by the Court.
This Note concludes that the Court deviated from its own mandate
that a state's death penalty sentencing scheme both provide clear
and objective standards to the sentencer, and enable the sentencer
1 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
2 Id. at 1541.
3 Id. at 1542-43.
4 Id. at 1545.
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to distinguish those who deserve the death penalty from those who
do not.
II. BACKGROUND
In Furman v. Georgia,5 the United States Supreme Court held
that the death penalty did not, per se, violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.6 How-
ever, in Furman the Court established that a state's death penalty
statute did violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition if the stat-
ute granted too much discretion to a sentencer. 7 The Furman deci-
sion was splintered, but the fundamental premise that emerged
from the various opinions was that the death penalty could not be
imposed under sentencing procedures that granted untrammeled
discretion to the sentencer and therefore created a risk that the
death penalty would be administered in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.8 The Supreme Court currently interprets Furman and the
cases that followed it as requiring a two-pronged inquiry into a
state's capital sentencing procedures: (1) Does the state's capital
sentencing procedure adequately limit the sentencer's discretion so
as to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious administration of
the death penalty? (2) Does the state's capital sentencing scheme
genuinely narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty?9
A. SUFFICIENT NARROWING OF A SENTENCER'S DISCRETION
While the United States Supreme Court has held that a state's
5 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6 Id. at 307 (Stewart, J., concurring). The United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also Note, Discretion and the
Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1690-91 (1974),
for a brief summary of the Court's holding in Furman.
7 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Leading Case, Death
Penalty-Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances, 104 HARV. L. REV. 139 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Leading Case].
8 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9 Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1540, 1542 (1993) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497
U.S. 764, 774 (1990); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)). For further commen-
tary regarding the required inquiry see Gary J. Vyneman, Comment, Irreconcilable Differ-
ences: The Role of Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Punishment Sentencing Schemes, 13
WHITrIER L. REV. 763 (1992); Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided
Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1991);
David R. Zipps et al., Project, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1289-90 (1990); Omar
Malone, Comment, Capital Punishment Statutes and the Administration of Criminal Justice:
(Un)equal Protection Under the Law!, 15 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 87 (1989-90).
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capital sentencing scheme must sufficiently channel a sentencer's
discretion, it has never pinpointed the amount of discretion that
constitutionally can be granted to a sentencer.10 Indeed, the Court
has struggled for years to identify such a standard.
1. The Inquiry Into Permissible Discretion
In attempting sufficiently to channel sentencers' discretion after
Furman, the majority of states that allowed the death penalty
adopted lists of aggravating circumstances to be considered before a
court could impose a sentence of death." Soon thereafter, the
Supreme Court was called upon to define the amount of sentencer
discretion permissible in aggravating circumstances.
In struggling to identify an acceptable amount of discretion, the
Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,12 first recognized that a state court's nar-
rowing construction of an aggravating circumstance may be consid-
ered if a state's capital sentencing statute, on its face, allows for too
10 Leading Case, supra note 7, at 139.
11 Capital sentencing schemes differ from state to state, but nearly all require a sepa-
rate sentencing hearing after a conviction for a capital offense at which the sentencing
judge or sentencing jury is required to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigat-
ing circumstances. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1993) ("[The
court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances included in
... this section and shall impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in... this section and that there are no mitigat-
ing circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(3) (West 1985) (before the death penalty is imposed, the court must find
"[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist.., and... [t]hat there are insufficient
mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances"); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1994) ("Unless at least one of the statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances enumerated in this act is so found or if it is found that any such aggra-
vating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating
circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed."). Although all states that imple-
mented the death penalty enumerate aggravating circumstances, mitigating circum-
stances frequently are not enumerated. See infra note 102 for a typical enumeration of
aggravating circumstances. For one example of enumerated mitigating circumstances
see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 1985):
(6) Mitigating Circumstances.-Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domina-
tion of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
12 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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much sentencer discretion.' 3 In that case, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of Georgia's sentencing scheme, which required
that the jury consider ten statutory aggravating circumstances, at
least one of which had to be found to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt before a death sentence could be imposed. 14 Although the
petitioner did not claim that the jury relied on a vague or overbroad
provision, the petitioner looked at the sentencing system as a whole,
arguing that the circumstances were overly broad and too vague.' 5
The petitioner explicitly attacked the aggravating circumstance that
authorized the imposition of the death penalty if the murder was
"' outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim.' "16 The petitioner claimed that this phrase was a catch-all
that could be imposed in any murder case and therefore violated the
Supreme Court's mandate in Furman, insofar as it allowed arbitrary
implementation of the death penalty.' 7
In holding that Georgia's "wantonly vile" aggravating circum-
stance was not necessarily unconstitutionally vague, the Court
agreed with the petitioner that any murder might involve depravity
of mind or an aggravated battery.' 8 However, the Court found that
the language in question would not necessarily be construed in so
broad a fashion by Georgia courts and that there was no reason to
assume that the Georgia Supreme Court would adopt such an open-
ended definition.' 9 Thus, in Gregg, the Court indicated that if a
state's sentencing scheme, on its face, did not sufficiently channel a
sentencer's discretion, the state's courts could adopt a narrowing
13 Id. at 201.
14 Id. at 164-65.
15 Id. at 200.
16 Id. at 201 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)). Petitioner attacked
this aggravating circumstance despite the fact that the sentencing jury did not find this
circumstance to apply to him. Id. at 161.
17 Id. at 198, 201.
18 Id. at 201.
19 Id. The Court did not know how Georgia courts interpreted the "wantonly vile"
aggravating circumstance because it was not found to apply in this case and had only
been relied on in three other cases. Injarrell v. State, 216 S.E.2d 258, 270 (Ga. 1975), a
number of other aggravating circumstances were found to exist as well, so the narrowing
construction of the circumstance in question was not explicitly articulated. In Floyd v.
State, 210 S.E.2d 810, 814 (Ga. 1974), two aggravating circumstances were found to
apply to the defendant, but rather than investigate each on its own, the court opted
simply to undertake a proportionality review. Thus, once again, the narrowing construc-
tion was not articulated. The third case, which relied exclusively on the "wantonly vile"
aggravating circumstance, was a brutal torture-murder, and therefore the circumstance
was deemed applicable without a narrowing construction. McCorquodale v. State, 211
S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1974).
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construction and therefore "save" the statute.20
When the Georgia sentencing scheme was revisited just four
years later in Godfrey v. Georgia,2 1 the Court found the aggravating
circumstance considered in Gregg to be unconstitutionally vague as
applied by the trial court.22 Although the Court noted, as it had in
Gregg, that the circumstance on its face did not preclude arbitrary
and capricious infliction of the death penalty,23 the Court recog-
nized that Georgia's courts had sufficiently narrowed the scope of
the circumstance in question in two prior cases. 24 Nonetheless, the
Court held the circumstance unconstitutional as applied because the
trial judge's sentencing instructions to the jury failed to articulate
the narrowing construction and therefore did not sufficiently narrow
the circumstance. 2
5
Thus, in Godfrey, the Court again recognized that a state
supreme court can narrow the scope of a circumstance that is un-
constitutionally vague on its face. 26 Additionally, the Godfrey Court
cautioned that, in order to save the circumstance from constitutional
infirmity, the trial court must instruct the jury as to the narrowed
construction. 27
In Walton v. Arizona,28 the Court clearly articulated the inquiry a
federal court must make when considering a state's death penalty
statute:
[The federal court] must first determine whether the statutory lan-
guage defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide any gui-
dance to the sentencer. If so, then the federal court must determine
20 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201. See also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990) (reaf-
firming the possibility of a state court narrowing construction).
21 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
22 Id. at 432.
23 Id. at 428-29. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24 Id. at 430-32. The Court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court, both in Blake v.
State, 236 S.E.2d 637, 643 (Ga. 1977), and in Harris v. State, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (Ga.
1976), narrowed the definition of the "wantonly vile" aggravating circuinstance:
The Harris and Blake opinions suggest that the Georgia Supreme Court had by 1977
reached three separate but consistent conclusions respecting the § (b)(7) aggravat-
ing circumstance. The first was that the evidence that the offense was "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" had to demonstrate "torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." The second was that the phrase,
"depravity of mind," comprehended only the kind of mental state that led the mur-
derer to torture or to commit an aggravated battery before killing his victim. The
third, derived from Blake alone, was that the word, "torture," must be construed in
pari materia with "aggravated battery" so as to require evidence of serious physical
abuse of the victim before death.
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 431.
25 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 430-33.
26 Id. at 428-32.
27 Id. at 429, 432.
28 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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whether the state courts have further defined the vague terms and, if
they have done so, whether those definitions are constitutionally suffi-
cient, i.e., whether they provide some guidance to the sentencer.29
In Walton, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of an
Arizona aggravating circumstance that charged the sentencer to
consider whether a murder was committed "'in an especially hei-
nous, cruel, or depraved manner.' "0 The Court held that,
although the circumstance on its own was unconstitutionally vague,
Arizona courts had sufficiently channeled the circumstance by de-
claring that "'a crime [was] committed in an especially cruel man-
ner when the perpetrator inflict[ed] mental anguish or physical
abuse before the victim's death,' and that '[m]ental anguish in-
clude[d] a victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate.' "3i Likewise,
the Arizona Supreme Court found that a murder was committed in
an "especially 'depraved' manner when the perpetrator 'relishe[d]
the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,' or 'show[ed] an
indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidence[d] a sense of
pleasure' in the killing."3 2 The Court found that, although "the
proper degree of definition of an aggravating factor ... is not sus-
ceptible of mathematical precision," the Arizona narrowing con-
struction sufficiently channeled the sentencer's discretion.
3 3
The inquiry that a federal court must undertake, therefore, is
quite clear: as long as a state's courts sufficiently narrow a vague
aggravating circumstance and the sentencing jury is informed as to
this narrowing construction, the sentencer's discretion has been suf-
ficiently channeled.3 4 However, the Court is still left with a difficult
question: When is the guidance offered a sentencer-either by a
statutory aggravating circumstance or by a narrowing construc-
tion-"sufficient"? The Court has wrestled with this question since
Furman.
2. The Sufficient Channeling of Discretion
Since the inquiry into whether an aggravating circumstance or a
narrowing construction sufficiently channels a sentencer's discretion
29 Id. at 654.
30 Id. at 643 (quoting ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (F)(6) (1989)).
31 Id. at 654 (quoting State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (Ariz. 1989)).
32 Id. at 655 (quoting Walton, 769 P.2d at 1033).
33 Id. See also Lori L. Nader, Note, Walton v. Arizona: The Confusion Surrounding the
Sentencing of Capital Defendants Continues, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 475 (1991), for further anal-
ysis of the Walton decision.
34 If sentencing is to be done by a judge, the only requirement is that the state courts
sufficiently narrow a vague aggravating circumstance. The judge is assumed to know
this narrowing construction. Walton, 497 U.S. at 653.
832 [Vol. 84
CAPITAL SENTENCING
is necessarily done on a case-by-case basis, the United States
Supreme Court, on a number of occasions, has reviewed the aggra-
vating circumstances and/or the narrowing constructions of state
capital sentencing schemes. A brief overview of a number of these
decisions provides insight into the level of definition or channeling
the Court deems "sufficient."
In Proffitt v. Florida,3 5 the petitioner challenged the constitution-
ality of Florida's capital sentencing scheme, which required the sen-
tencing judge to determine whether the capital crime committed
was "'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' "36 The petitioner
claimed that this circumstance was unconstitutionally vague and
therefore allowed arbitrary decisions in violation of Furman.3 7 The
Court, granting that the circumstance was unconstitutionally vague
on its face,38 considered the circumstance in conjunction with the
narrowing construction offered by the Florida Supreme Court in
State v. Dixon.3 9 In that case, the Florida Supreme Court found that
the aggravating circumstance in question was "directed only at 'the
conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to
the victim.' ",40 The United States Supreme Court found that, as so
narrowed, the circumstance provided adequate guidance to
sentencers and therefore was constitutional.
41
Similarly, in Godfrey v. Georgia, the Supreme Court found that
the Georgia Supreme Court had sufficiently narrowed Georgia's
unconstitutionally vague "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman" aggravating circumstance. 42 The Georgia Supreme
Court had indicated that the circumstance required a showing that
the offense demonstrated " 'torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim.' ,,43 More specifically, "depravity of
mind" referred to "the kind of mental state that led the murderer to
torture or to commit an aggravated battery before killing his
35 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
36 Id. at 255 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (5)(h) (Supp. 1976-77)).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
40 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 9).
41 Id. at 255-56.
42 446 U.S. 420, 431-32 (1980). However, in Godfrey, after finding that the Georgia
courts had sufficiently narrowed the aggravating circumstance in question, the Supreme
Court reversed petitioner's death sentence because the judge did not instruct the sen-
tencing jury as to this constitutionally satisfactory narrowing construction. Id. at 432.
See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text for a dicussion of this case.
43 Id. at 431 (quoting Harris v. State, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (Ga. 1976); Blake v. State,
236 S.E.2d 637, 643 (Ga. 1977)).
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victim." 4 4 Additionally, " 'torture' require[d] evidence of serious
physical abuse of the victim before death."' 45 The narrowing con-
struction, the Court held, sufficiently channeled a sentencer's dis-
cretion and therefore saved the vague aggravating circum-
stance.
4 6
In Lewis v. Jeffers,47 the Supreme Court found that Arizona had
sufficiently narrowed its admittedly vague "especially heinous, cruel
or depraved" aggravating circumstance. 48 The Court noted that the
Arizona Supreme Court had consulted the dictionary and applied
the dictionary definitions of the statutory terms in order to narrow
the circumstance in question. The Arizona Supreme Court had de-
termined that " '[t]he element of cruelty involves the pain and the
mental and physical distress visited upon the victims. Heinous and
depraved involve the mental state and attitude of the perpetrator as
reflected in his words and actions.' 49 Further, the Arizona
Supreme Court identified factors that fulfilled the circumstance in
question. For example, "gratuitous violence [to] the victim" was
one factor to be considered; "the apparent relish with which the de-
fendant committ[ed] the murder" was another. 50 These definitions
and elements, the Supreme Court found, sufficiently channeled the
vague aggravating circumstance and therefore cured the statute of
constitutional infirmity. 5'
TheJeffers Court also refused to undertake a case by case analy-
sis of Arizona decisions in attempting to determine whether the
state's narrowing construction was sufficiently focused. 52 The Court
held that "if a State [had] adopted a constitutionally narrow con-
struction of a facially vague aggravating circumstance. .. [and had]
applied that construction to the facts of the particular case," then
the constitutional requirement of limited discretion had been met.53
The consistency of application of the narrowing construction in
other Arizona cases was irrelevant.54
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has found in
44 Id. (citing Harris, 230 S.E.2d at 10-11; Blake, 236 S.E.2d at 643).
45 Id. (citing Blake, 236 S.E.2d at 643). See supra note 24 for the full text of Georgia's
narrowing construction.
46 Id. at 431-32.
47 497 U.S. 764 (1990).
48 Id. at 777-78.
49 Id. at 769 (quoting State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105, 1130 (Ariz. 1982)).
50 Id. at 770 (citingJeffers, 661 P.2d at 1131).
51 Id. at 777-78.
52 Id. at 778-79.
53 Id. at 779.
54 Id. at 779-80.
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other cases that the guidance offered to a sentencer either by an
aggravating circumstance or by a narrowing construction was insuf-
ficient. For example, in Maynard v. Cartwright,55 the Court was
presented with the same circumstance that the Court assumed was
facially unconstitutional in Proffitt.56 Unlike Proffitt, however, in May-
nard the Supreme Court found that the state had insufficiently nar-
rowed this unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance. 57 In
Maynard, the state of Oklahoma argued that some murders, based
simply on their facts, qualified as" 'especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.' "58 The Supreme Court disagreed. It began its analysis as-
serting that "[c]laims of vagueness directed at aggravating circum-
stances defined in capital punishment statutes are analyzed under
the Eighth Amendment and characteristically assert that the chal-
lenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must
find to impose the death penalty." 59 With regard to this analysis,
the Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit's finding that although the
sentencer considered "the attitude of the killer, the manner of the
killing, and the suffering of the victim to be relevant and sufficient to
support the aggravating circumstance, [the trial court] had 'refused
to hold that any one of those factors must be present for a murder to
satisfy this aggravating circumstance.' "60 Because the circumstance
failed to inform sentencing juries what they had to find to impose the
death penalty, it therefore allowed too much discretion. 61 Conse-
quently, the circumstance was deemed unconstitutional under
Furman.62
Likewise, in Shell v. Mississippi63 the Court found Mississippi's
narrowing construction of its "especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel" aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague. The Mis-
sissippi narrowing construction declared that " 'the word heinous
means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outra-
geously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed to inflict a high
degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of[,] the suf-
fering of others.' "64 This, the Court determined, was too vague to
55 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
56 The aggravating circumstance asked whether the crime committed was "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel." See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
57 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364-65.
58 Id. at 361 (quoting OxLA. STAT., TiT. 21, § 701.12(4) (1981)).
59 Id. at 361-62.
60 Id. at 360 (quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987)).
61 Id. at 363-65.
62 Id. at 365-66.
63 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam).




channel a sentencer's discretion sufficiently. 65
To varying degrees, each of the narrowing constructions vali-
dated by the United States Supreme Court channeled a sentencer's
discretion by "clear and objective standards." 66 For example, in
Proffitt, the crime had to be "unnecessarily torturous" to the vic-
tim; 67 in Godfrey, evidence of torture or aggravated battery was re-
quired; 68 and in Lewis, the crime had to indicate that there was
mental and physical distress visited upon the victim. 6 9 By contrast,
in Maynard, the sentencing jury was not instructed that there was
anything it had to find before it could impose the death penalty, 70
and in Shell, there was no "clear and objective" criteria in Missis-
sippi's narrowing construction. 7' Thus, the requirement fundamen-
tal to the Supreme Court's analysis in each of these cases was the
need for objective criteria in a state's aggravating circumstance or
narrowing construction.
B. GENUINE NARROWING OF THE CLASS OF DEATH-ELIGIBLE
DEFENDANTS
In Zant v. Stephens, 72 the Court identified an inquiry distinct
from the "sufficiently channeled" requirement. In Zant, the Court
declared that a state's capital sentencing scheme must "genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to the others found guilty of murder." 73 The
Court held that aggravating circumstances that allowed the death
penalty to be imposed if the offender had a prior record of convic-
tion for a capital felony or if the offender had escaped from lawful
confinement genuinely narrowed the broad class of those eligible
for the death penalty.
7 4
In Lowenfield v. Phelps,75 the Court identified two ways that a
state may satisfy the "genuinely narrows" function. Either a state's
legislature can "broadly define capital offenses and provide for nar-
rowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty
65 Id. at 1.
66 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion).
67 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
69 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
72 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
73 Id. at 877.
74 Id. at 879.
75 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
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phase," or "[t]he legislature may itself narrow the definition of capi-
tal offenses," so that the jury finding at the guilt phase meets the
"genuinely narrows" requirement. 76 The Court indicated that Lou-
isiana's capital sentencing scheme genuinely narrowed the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty by narrowing the definition
of capital offenses. The Court held that since, at the guilt phase, the
jury found that the defendant had " 'a specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person,'" the class of
death-eligible offenders had been genuinely narrowed.
77
Although the difference between this requirement and the "suf-
ficiently channel" prong is subtle, one can certainly imagine an ag-
gravating circumstance or narrowing -construction that completely
channels a sentencer's discretion yet does not genuinely narrow the
class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. For example, an
aggravating circumstance that allows the administration of the death
penalty in all cases of first-degree murder entirely eliminates sen-
tencer discretion but, depending on the structure of a state's capital
sentencing scheme, probably fails to narrow the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty.
In sum, prior to Arave v. Creech, an aggravating circumstance
was unconstitutionally vague either if it failed sufficiently to channel
the discretion of the sentencer or if it failed genuinely to narrow the
class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. With this prece-
dent as a guide, the United States Supreme Court decided the con-
stitutionality of the Idaho aggravating circumstance that allowed
implementation of the death penalty if the killer displayed an "utter
disregard for human life."
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1981, Thomas Eugene Creech was serving life sentences in
the maximum security tier of the Idaho State Correctional Institu-
tion (hereinafter "the Institution") after admitting to killing or tak-
ing part in the killing of twenty-six people. 78 "The bodies of 11 of
his victims-who were shot, stabbed, beaten, or strangled to
death-ha[d] been recovered in seven states." 79 Creech declared
76 Id. at 246.
77 Id. (quoting the sentencing jury's findings pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:30A(3) (West 1986)).
78 Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (1993). There is some ambiguity as to how
many life sentences Creech was serving at this time. While the United States Supreme
Court's opinion indicated that Creech was serving "life sentences" at the time of this
murder, id., the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court maintained that Creech was serv-
ing only "a life sentence." State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (Idaho 1983).
79 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1538.
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that he would continue to kill unless he was "completely isolated
from humanity."
80
On May 13, 1981, Creech beat and kicked David DaleJensen to
death. Jensen was an inmate of the same tier at the Institution and
was serving a sentence for car theft.8 ' Some years prior to his incar-
ceration, Jensen was shot in the head; this wound required the re-
moval of a part of his brain and the insertion of a plastic plate into
his skull. As a result, Jensen's speech and motor functions were
slightly impaired.8
2
Generally, only one maximum security prisoner at a time was
allowed out of his cell.8 3 Since Creech had been made a janitor,
however, it was not uncommon for him to be out of his cell while
another inmate was exercising or showering.8 4 Prior to May 13,
1981, Jensen and Creech had argued about Jensen's littering and
general untidiness, for which Creech, as janitor, was responsible.8 5
Although Creech gave conflicting stories of the events sur-
rounding the killing,8 6 the trial court settled on the following ac-
count:8 7 On May 13, both Creech and Jensen were out of their
cells. 88 Jensen approached Creech and swung at him with a sock
containing two batteries.8 9 Creech was able to take the weapon
away fromJensen, who then returned to his cell.90 Soon thereafter,
Jensen emerged from his cell with a toothbrush with a razor blade
attached to it.91 A fight ensued in which Creech was hitting Jensen
with the the battery-filled sock and Jensen was swinging the razor
blade at Creech. 92 At some point, Creech connected with sufficient
force to shatter the plate imbedded in Jensen's skull and splatter
blood on the floor and walls. 93 Eventually, the sock broke and the
80 Id.
81 Brief of Petitioner at 4, Arave (No. 91-1160).




86 Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (1993). In her opinion, Justice O'Connor
indicated that there was a question as to whether Creech was acting in self-defense or
whether he had been bribed by other inmates to kill Jensen. However, the Idaho
Supreme Court clearly indicated that "the district court judge did not decide or find that
the murder had been performed on contract or plan." Creech, 670 P.2d at 465.




91 Brief of Respondent at 1-2, Arave (No. 91-1160).
92 Creech, 670 P.2d at 465.
93 Id.
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batteries fell to the floor, but by this time Jensen was helpless. 94
Creech then began kicking the prone Jensen in the head and
throat.95 "Sometime later a guard noticed blood, and Jensen was
taken to the hospital, where he died the same day." 96
Creech originally pleaded not guilty to the charge of first de-
gree murder.97 However, over the objection of his attorney, he
changed his plea to guilty. 98 At the sentencing hearing,99 the court
considered aggravating and mitigating evidence including evidence
by both the State and the defense relating to the mental condition of
Creech. 00 Among the mitigating factors, the judge found that since
Jensen instigated the fight with Creech, Creech was initially justified
in defending himself.161 In aggravation, the court found five cir-






99 Idaho law requires a sentencing hearing whenever the death penalty is possible
punishment:
In all cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, the court shall, after convic-
tion, order a presentence investigation to be conducted according to such proce-
dures as are prescribed by law and shall thereafter convene a sentencing hearing for
the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in aggrava-
tion and mitigation of the offense. At such hearing, the state and the defendant
shall be entitled to present all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation ....
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(d) (1987).
100 Creech, 670 P.2d at 466. Following the hearing and the consideration of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, the judge issued written findings of factors found to
exist both in aggravation and mitigation in the format prescribed by Rule 33.1 of the
Idaho Criminal Rules. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (1993).
101 Id. at 1538-39.
102 Id. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g) (1987) provides:
The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which
must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be
imposed:
(1) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder.
(2) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(4) The murder was committed for remuneration or the promise of remuneration
or the defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration.
(5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting excep-
tional depravity.
(6) By the murder, or the circumstances surrounding its commission, the defend-
ant exhibited utter disregard for human life.
(7) The murder was one defined as murder of the first degree by section 18-4003,
Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f), and it was accompanied with the
specific intent to cause the death of a human being.
(8) The defendant, by prior conduct, or conduct in the commission of the murder
at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably consti-
tute a continuing threat to society.
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the court found that, following the initial attack, Jensen was under
the complete domination of Creech. 03 Thus, although Creech ini-
tially acted in self-defense, 0 4 since Creech killed Jensen after he was
helpless, he exhibited an "utter disregard for human life."10 5 After
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the sentenc-
ing judge concluded that the mitigating circumstances did not out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances. 10 6 As a result, Creech was
sentenced to death.107
In reviewing Creech's sentence, 10 8 the Idaho Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the "utter disregard" statutory
aggravating circumstance. The court held that the circumstance was
not unconstitutionally vague once considered in conjunction with
Idaho's narrowing construction.' 0 9 The Idaho Supreme Court also
independently reviewed the record and found the evidence sup-
ported the sentencing judge's weighing of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances. 110 Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
Creech's sentence."'I Creech then filed a petition for a writ of certi-
orari in the United States Supreme Court. The petition was
denied. 112
Subsequently, Creech filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho. 113 The petition claimed, in relevant part, that the "utter dis-
regard" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague
(9) The murder was committed against a former or present peace officer, execu-
tive officer, officer of the court, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney because of
the exercise of official duty.
(10) The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness in a crimi-
nal or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding.
103 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1539.
104 Id.
105 Id. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) lists "utter disregard for human life" as one of
Idaho's statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances. See supra note 102.
106 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1539.
107 Id.
108 State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (Idaho 1983). IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(a)
(1987) states that "[w]henever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment
becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the
Supreme Court of Idaho." Creech also appealed the proceedings, actions, and orders of
the trial court. Creech, 670 P.2d at 465.
109 In State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981), the Idaho Supreme Court
narrowed the "utter disregard" circumstance: "We conclude instead that the phrase is
meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the
highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless
slayer."
110 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1539.
111 Creech, 670 P.2d at 476.
112 Creech v. Idaho, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
113 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1540.
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even if considered along with Idaho's narrowing construction." 14
The district court denied the petition." 5
Creech appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. 16 The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.' "7 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Creech that
the "utter disregard" aggravating circumstance, on its own, was un-
constitutionally vague because the circumstance did not enable the
sentencer to make a principled distinction between those who de-
served the death penalty and those who did not. 118 Additionally,
the court found that the Idaho Supreme Court's narrowing con-
struction did not cure this constitutional error because it gave no
more guidance than the circumstance itself. 1 9 In dissent, three
judges contended that the narrowing construction adopted by the
Idaho courts sufficiently channeled a sentencing judge's discretion
as it gave sentencers "substantive guidance" in administering the
death penalty.' 20 For this reason, the dissenters found that Idaho's
narrowing construction made constitutional the "utter disregard"
circumstance.1
2 1
The warden of the Institution petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 122 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address only the question of
whether the "utter disregard" aggravating circumstance was uncon-
stitutionally vague. 1
23
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals insofar as the Court
held that the "utter disregard" circumstance, as narrowed by the
Idaho courts, met constitutional requirements.
24
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,125 identified two re-
114 Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, Arave (No. 91-1160).
115 Arave, 113 S. Ct at 1540.
116 Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
117 Id. at 888.
118 Id. at 883.
119 Id. at 883-84.
120 Id. at 890.
121 Id.
122 Brief of Petitioner at 6, Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993) (No. 91-1160).
123 Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1540 (1993).
124 Id. at 1545.
125 Id. at 1538. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
Scalia, and White joined in the opinion.
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lated inquiries to be undertaken in determining whether an aggra-
vating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. 126 First, a capital
sentencing scheme must" 'suitably direct and limit' the sentencer's
discretion 'so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action.' "127 A state must satisfy this requirement by channel-
ing the sentencer's discretion with objective standards.128 Second, a
state's capital sentencing scheme must" 'genuinely narrow the class
of defendants eligible for the death penalty.' "129 With respect to
this requirement, Justice O'Connor explained that, if a sentencer
could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applied to every
defendant eligible for the death penalty, then the circumstance is
unconstitutional.
130
Justice O'Connor referred to the procedure articulated in Wal-
ton in order to begin the first inquiry. 13 1 The majority held that,
because Idaho courts had narrowed the "utter disregard" aggravat-
ing circumstance, it was not necessary to determine whether the cir-
cumstance was, on its own, constitutional.' 3 2 Justice O'Connor
indicated that in State v. Osborn' 33 the Idaho Supreme Court nar-
rowly interpreted the "utter disregard" circumstance as being " 're-
flective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which
exhibit[ed] the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life,
i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer.' -134 Disregarding all but the
last phrase of this narrowing construction, 3 5 the Court set out to
determine whether the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" element of the
narrowing construction sufficiently narrowed the "utter disregard"
circumstance. 1
3 6
The majority first attempted to determine the "everyday"
126 Id. at 1540, 1542.
127 Id. at 1540 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)).
128 Id. (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)).
129 Id. at 1542 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
130 Id. (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988)).
131 Id. at 1540-41. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
132 Id. at 1541.
1'3 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981).
134 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1539 (quoting Osborn, 631 P.2d at 200-01).
135 Although Justice O'Connor did not explain why she disregarded all but the ulti-
mate phrase of the narrowing construction, it is likely that she did so because the phrase
"highest, utmost, callous disregard for human life" allowed for at least as much subjec-
tivity as aggravating circumstances or narrowing constructions previously declared un-
constitutional by the Court. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980)
(finding that Georgia's aggravating circumstance that allowed the sentencer to consider
whether the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" did not
restrain the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty and therefore, on its
own, was unconstitutionally vague).
136 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1541.
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meaning of the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless." To do so, Jus-
tice O'Connor looked to Webster's Dictionary. "Pitiless," the Court
found, was defined as "devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy or compas-
sion"; "cold-blooded" meant "'marked by absence of warm feel-
ings: without consideration, compunction, or clemency,'" and
" 'matter of fact, emotionless.' ,,137 Condensing these definitions,
the majority determined that, in everyday usage, "cold-blooded piti-
less slayer" referred to the killer who killed "without feeling or sym-
pathy."138 In arriving at this definition, the Court dismissed Black's
Law Dictionary's definition of "cold-blooded" as "'premedi-
tated.' "139 Since premeditation is directly addressed in Idaho's
homicide statutes, Justice O'Connor asserted, if the Idaho Supreme
Court had thought the words were identical in meaning, it would
have used the word "premeditated" instead of "cold-blooded." ' 140
The Court then challenged the Ninth Circuit's claim that the
phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" required a subjective determi-
nation by the sentencer and therefore was unconstitutional. 141 The
majority explained that "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" described the
defendant's state of mind, "not a 'subjective' matter, but afact to be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances." 142 Justice O'Connor
acknowledged that "[d]etermining whether a capital defendant
killed without feeling or sympathy is undoubtedly more difficult
than, for example, determining whether [the defendant] 'was previ-
ously convicted of another murder.' "143 However, although " 'not
susceptible of mathematical precision,' "144 such a determination
was not precluded by the United States Constitution. 145 In sum, the
Court held that the Idaho Supreme Court's limiting construction
was sufficiently narrow. 146
Turning to the second inquiry, the Court considered whether
the Idaho narrowing construction genuinely narrowed the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty. Justice O'Connor indi-
cated that in Idaho all first degree murderers were eligible for capi-
tal punishment and that the category of first-degree murderers was
137 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1726 (1986)).
138 Id.
139 Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (6th ed. 1990)).
140 Id.
141 Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d, 873, 884 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
142 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1541-42 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716-17 (1983)).
143 Id. at 1542 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 19 -2515(g)(1) (1987)). See supra note 102.





very broad. 147 The majority then acknowledged that the word "piti-
less," on its own, might not narrow the class of defendants eligible
for the death penalty because a sentencer might determine that
every first-degree murderer was pitiless. 148 By contrast, the Court
found that the phrase "cold-blooded" genuinely limited the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty because some first-degree
murderers did exhibit feelings, such as anger, jealousy, or re-
venge.' 49 Justice O'Connor was uneasy with this finding, however,
and recognized that the question of whether the Idaho narrowing
construction genuinely narrowed the class of defendants eligible for
the death penalty was a "close" one.150 Despite this uneasiness, the
Court found that the Idaho limiting construction, particularly the
phrase "cold-blooded," genuinely narrowed the number of defend-
ants eligible for capital punishment. 5 1
The majority then turned to Creech's argument that the "utter
disregard" circumstance was unconstitutional because it had not
been applied consistently in other cases decided in the Idaho
courts. 152 This inconsistency, Creech maintained, proved that the
circumstance was simply a catch-all.' 53 The Court rejected this ar-
gument for three reasons. First, the majority held that the fact that
the Idaho courts found first-degree murderers "pitiless" and "cold-
blooded" in cases with varied fact patterns was to be expected and
did not raise a constitutional question. 154 Second, referring to its
decision in Lewis, the Court explained that it would not investigate
whether an aggravating circumstance had been applied consistently
by state courts;' 5 5 rather, it would only consider whether the aggra-
vating circumstance and its corresponding narrowing construction
had been consistently formulated.' 5 6 Indeed, the Idaho Supreme
147 Id. at 1542-43 (citing IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1987)).
148 Id. at 1543.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1542.
151 Id. at 1543.
152 Brief of Respondent at 19-24, Arave (No. 91-1160).
153 Id. at 23-24.
'54 Arave, 113 S. Ct at 1543.
155 Id. at 1543-44 (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 778-80 (1990)). See supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's refusal to examine,
case-by-case, a state's decisions implementing an aggravating circumstance in question.
156 Id. By "consistent formulation," the majority meant simply that the same facial
language was employed. Id. at 1544. For example, because Idaho courts often cited
verbatim the Osborn court's "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" narrowing construction, the
courts consistently "formulated" the narrowing construction. Id. Alternatively, by
"consistent application," the majority meant that the narrowing construction was ap-
plied only to a definable class of cases; for example, whether all defendants given death
sentences shared an identifiable trait. Id. at 1543-44.
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Court had consistently articulated the narrowing construction of the
"utter disregard" aggravating circumstance, often simply quoting
the Osborn "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" language.1 57 Finally, the
Court maintained that a comparison to other Idaho decisions would
be "particularly inappropriate" in this case because none of the
cases upon which Creech relied had been decided at the time the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Creech's sentence.158 Thus, the ma-
jority held that the sentencing judge was not influenced by these
cases.' 59 In sum, the majority held that "[i]n light of the consistent
narrowing definition given the 'utter disregard' circumstance by the
Idaho Supreme Court," the circumstance met constitutional
standards.160
As a final point, the majority found unpersuasive Creech's argu-
ment that the "utter disregard" aggravating circumstance, if consti-
tutional, could not apply to him because the trial judge found that
he was provoked by Jensen and displayed an "excessive violent
rage." 161 Creech maintained that this finding was irreconcilable
with a finding of "utter disregard for human life."' 162 The Court
held that this was a question of state law and that such a finding by a
state court would only violate the Constitution if " 'no reasonable
sentencer' could find the circumstance to exist."1 63 By refusing to
reconsider the issue, the majority concluded that the decision to
sentence Creech to death was reasonable.
1 64
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Blackmun wrote a blistering dissent in which he was
joined by Justice Stevens. The dissenters agreed with the majority
that, under Walton, federal courts should determine whether state
courts have sufficiently narrowed an unconstitutionally broad aggra-
vating circumstance. 165 The dissenters then addressed the question
of whether the Idaho Supreme Court had sufficiently focused the
aggravating circumstance with its "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" nar-
rowing construction.'66




161 Brief of Respondent at 25-27, Arave (No. 91-1160).
162 Id.
163 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1544 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783 (1990)).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 29 and accompanying text
for the Walton Court's mandate.
166 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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First, granting that "without feeling or sympathy" was a plausi-
ble definition of "cold-blooded pitiless slayer," Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that "without feeling or sympathy" did not sufficiently narrow
a sentencer's discretion. The dissent argued that this definition was
no different from the "devoid of mercy or compassion" definition of
"pitiless" that the majority found did not genuinely narrow the class
of those eligible for the death penalty. 167 However, even if there
was a distinction between "devoid of mercy and compassion" and
"without feeling or sympathy," the dissent contended first that
"without feeling or sympathy" had never been employed by the
Idaho courts as the definition of "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" and
second, that such a definition certainly did not obviously flow from
the phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer."' 168 Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that this was evidence that the phrase was susceptible to a vari-
ety of definitions and therefore unconstitutional.1 69 He claimed that
"the State must provide a construction that, on its face, reasonably
can be expected to be applied in a consistent and meaningful way so
as to provide the sentencer with adequate guidance. The metaphor
'cold-blooded' does not do this."' 170
In making its first point the dissent deferred to the majority's
definition of "cold-blooded pitiless slayer,"'' but the dissent next
challenged the majority's definition of "cold-blooded pitiless
slayer" as "without feeling or sympathy" in three ways: (1) by inves-
tigating the ordinary usage of the phrase "cold-blooded";' 72 (2) by
determining its legal usage;' 73 and (3) by examining its application
in the Idaho courts. 174
First, in addressing the ordinary usage of "cold-blooded," the
dissent quoted the dictionary definition of "cold-blooded" used by
the majority: "'marked by absence of warm feelings: without con-
167 Id. at 1546 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra notes 137, 148 and accompanying
text for the majority's argument on this point. When the majority addressed whether
Idaho's narrowing construction genuinely limited the number of first-degree murderers
eligible for the death penalty, it asserted that the word "pitiless," on its own, did not
genuinely narrow the eligible class. Id. at 1543. Prior to this determination the Court
defined "pitiless" as "devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy or compassion." Id. at 1541.
Thus, to the dissent, the phrase "without feeling or sympathy," because nearly identical
to "devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy or compassion," had to be held constitutionally
infirm under the majority's analysis.
168 Id. at 1546 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
172 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1546-47 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 1547-48 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 1548-49 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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sideration, compunction or mercy.' "175 "What murderer," Justice
Blackmun asked incredulously, "does act with consideration or com-
punction or clemency?" 176 The dissent chastised the majority for
virtually ignoring this constitutionally insufficient definition of
"cold-blooded" and instead deriving its "without feeling or sympa-
thy" "hybrid" definition. 177 In everyday usage, the dissent argued,
the phrase "cold-blooded" does not mean "without feeling or sym-
pathy," but rather is regularly used to describe killings that are
spurred by deep emotion. 178 To support this view, Justice Black-
mun cited a number of recent clippings from periodicals that de-
scribed killings as "cold-blooded" despite the fact that they were
provoked by jealousy, hatred, humiliation, and so forth. 179
The dissent then cited Black's Law Dictionary to show that, in
legal parlance, the term "cold-blooded" has generally been used to
distinguish between first and second degree murders.' 80 As so de-
fined, the phrase could not possibly separate those first-degree mur-
derers deserving the death penalty from those not so deserving and,
therefore, was dearly unconstitutional.18
Finally, the dissent chastised the majority for refusing to ex-
amine cases decided by Idaho courts.18 2 The dissent maintained
that such precedent was relevant because the Osborn narrowing con-
struction that the majority claimed was consistently invoked by
Idaho courts had never meant what the majority said it meant; that
is, "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" had never been defined by Idaho
courts to mean "without feeling or sympathy."' 1 3 The dissent
strenuously contended that consistent citing of the "cold-blooded
pitiless slayer" standard was of no value if the standard defied defi-
nition.18 4 The dissent believed that the fact that the Osborn con-
struction had been cited so frequently, yet had been applied to so
many different fact patterns, indicated that the construction was not
sufficiently narrow.18
5
As a final point, the dissent noted that the trial judge found that
175 Id. at 1546 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting majority's definition). See supra note
137 and accompanying text.
176 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1546 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 1546-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 1547 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
180 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing BLACK's Laxv DICTIONARY 260 (6th ed. -1990)).
181 Id. at 1548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 1548-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 1548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 1548-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Creech had acted in an "excessive violent rage" in killingJensen. 186
Given this characterization, "[i]f Creech somehow [was] covered by
the 'utter disregard' factor as understood by the majority (one who
kills not with anger, but indifference), then there can be no doubt
that the factor [was] so broad as to cover any case." Conversely,
"[i]f Creech [was] not covered, then his sentence was wrongly im-
posed."18 7 Thus, either the circumstance as construed by Idaho
courts was unconstitutionally vague, or it could not apply to Creech.
V. ANALYSIS
In Arave v. Creech, the United States Supreme Court altered the
procedure used to determine whether a statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance sufficiently channels a sentencer's discretion and genu-
inely narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.
As a result, the Court extended the amount of discretion that consti-
tutionally may be granted to a sentencer in administering the death
penalty. 188 The Court began its analysis by identifying the stan-
dards for determining whether an aggravating circumstance is un-
constitutionally vague.189 In determining whether the Idaho statute
in question met these standards, however, the Supreme Court un-
dertook an unprecedented inquiry. By consulting the dictionary to
define Idaho's "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" narrowing construc-
tion and then further narrowing the procured definition, the Court
exhibited a willingness to uphold an aggravating circumstance even
if the Supreme Court itself must further define the state's narrowing
construction. By taking the unprecedented step of narrowing a
state's own narrowing construction, the Supreme Court allowed to
stand an aggravating circumstance that neither sufficiently chan-
neled a sentencer's discretion nor genuinely narrowed the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty.
A. THE COURT NARROWED IDAHO'S NARROWING CONSTRUCTION
Prior to Arave, the Supreme Court had never independently
channeled a state's narrowing construction. Yet the Court did just
186 Id. at 1549-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 1550 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188 See Troy R. Olsen, Comment, "Utter Disregard for Human Life "-A Clear and Objective
Standard for the Purpose of Imposing the Death Penalty?, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 421 (1991-92).
This Comment praises the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Creech v. Arave,
947 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1991), which declared Idaho's "utter disregard" aggravating cir-
cumstance unconstitutionally vague. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text for
the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
189 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1540, 1542.
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that in Arave in order to save the Idaho death penalty statute. The
majority distilled several dictionary definitions of "cold-blooded"
and "pitiless" and determined that the phrase "cold-blooded piti-
less slayer" referred to a killer who killed "without feeling or sympa-
thy." 190 The Court adopted this definition of "cold-blooded pitiless
slayer," despite the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court had never
articulated a similar definition. 191
In cases decided before Arave, the Court simply examined a
state's narrowing construction of its aggravating circumstance to de-
termine whether the aggravating circumstance sufficiently chan-
neled a sentencer's discretion. For example, in Walton, the Court
recognized that the Arizona Supreme Court had sufficiently nar-
rowed the scope of the state's "especially heinous, cruel or de-
praved" aggravating circumstance. 192 In making this determination,
the Court simply considered the narrowing done by the Arizona
Supreme Court, and refrained from defining further the Arizona
narrowing construction. 193 Similarly, in Proflitt, the Court consid-
ered only the Florida Supreme Court's narrowing construction of
Florida's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating cir-
cumstance in finding the circumstance constitutional.' 94
Perhaps even more illustrative of this point is Shell, in which the
Supreme Court determined that Mississippi's narrowing construc-
tion of its "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating cir-
cumstance was unconstitutionally vague. 195 Despite the fact that the
Court was eventually to find the circumstance unconstitutionally
190 Id. at 1541. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
191 Id. at 1548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299, 322
(Idaho 1989) (citing the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" language of Osborn without offer-
ing any further definition); State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252, 269 (Idaho 1989) ("utter disre-
gard" circumstance "refers not to the outrageousness of the acts constituting the
murder, but to the defendant's lack of conscientious scruples against killing"); State v.
Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1092 (Idaho 1991) (simply citing the Fain definition of the "utter
disregard" circumstance); Fetterly v. Paskett, 747 F. Supp. 594, 605 (D. Idaho 1990)
(holding that Idaho courts had sufficiently narrowed the "utter disregard" circumstance
in Osborn, Fain, and Charboneau and therefore that further definition was not needed);
State v. Aragon, 690 P.2d 293, 302 (Idaho 1984) (no expansion of the Osborn definition);
State v. Pizzuto, 810 P.2d 680, 710 (Idaho 1991) (citing Charboneau, Aragon, and other
Idaho cases and failing to define further the circumstance). See also State v. Paz, 798 P.2d
1 (Idaho 1990); Sivak v. State, 731 P.2d 192 (Idaho 1986); State v. Caudill, 706 P.2d 456
(Idaho 1985); State v. Paradis, 676 P.2d 31 (Idaho 1983).
192 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990). See supra notes 30-33 and accompa-
nying text.
193 Walton, 497 U.S. at 655.
194 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976) (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1,
9 (Fla. 1973)). See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.




vague, in a brief per curiam opinion, the Court never consulted a
dictionary or considered the plain meaning or any other meaning of
a word in the narrowing construction. Rather, the Court held that
"[a]lthough the trial court in this case used a limiting instruction to
define the 'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel' factor, that in-
struction is not constitutionally sufficient."1 96 By contrast, when
presented with an unconstitutional construction in Arave, the Court
went to great pains to derive a serviceable definition. The Supreme
Court's unprecedented narrowing of Idaho's "cold-blooded pitiless
slayer" narrowing construction was tantamount to an acknowledg-
ment that the construction, on its own, was unconstitutionally
vague.
B. SUFFICIENT CHANNELING
The phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" provides significantly
less guidance to a sentencer than any construction upheld by the
Court prior to Arave. Absent from the phrase are objective criteria,
considered crucial by the Court in Walton, Proffitt, and Godfrey.1
9 7
The "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" construction requires no such
objective criteria and therefore violates the standard originally set
forth in Gregg.
198
A comparison of the narrowing construction found unconstitu-
tionally vague in Shell and the one validated in Arave clearly illus-
trates that the Court validated an unconstitutional narrowing
construction in Arave. First, the construction under consideration in
Arave simply contained the phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer,"
whereas the construction in Shell contained elements similar to
those previously deemed sufficient by the Court. For example, in
Shell v. State, 199 the Mississippi Supreme Court had held that "cruel
means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to,
or even enjoyment of[,] the suffering of others." 200 This standard
echoed standards previously validated by the Court that, for exam-
ple, required a sentencer to determine whether there was torture to
196 Shell, 498 U.S. at 1.
197 See supra notes 24, 30-33, and 36-41 and accompanying text for the Court's analy-
sis of the aggravating circumstances in Godfrey, Walton, and Proffitt respectively.
198 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion). See Olsen, supra
note 188, at 433. "Rather than defining 'utter disregard,' the court in Osborn merely
emphasized it. Unlike the limiting constructions considered in Walton, Maynard, Godfrey
and Proffitt, there is nothing in the Osborn court's construction which contained even the
slightest reference to any objectively-verifiable facts."
199 554 So. 2d 887 (Miss. 1989).
200 Id. at 906.
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the victim or whether the murderer relished his crime. 20 Despite
this similarity, the Shell construction was deemed unconstitutional.
By contrast, the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" construction contains
none of these facial similarities.
Second, while determining whether an action is "designed to
inflict a high degree of pain," or whether an actor displayed "indif-
ference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others," suggests
an objective look at the facts of a case (for example, such a determi-
nation can be made by simply investigating an individual's actions),
the phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" commands no such objec-
tive inquiry. It is not at all apparent how one would objectively de-
termine whether an individual is a "cold-blooded pitiless slayer."
Indeed, the Court virtually admitted this by further defining the
phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer." Only when the Court defined
"cold-blooded pitiless slayer" as a killer who acted "without feeling
or sympathy" was it able to point to objective criteria that indicated
"cold-bloodedness" and "pitilessness. ' 20 2
There can be little doubt that the narrowing construction of-
fered in Shell channeled a sentencer's discretion to a greater extent
than did the limiting construction offered in Arave; yet the construc-
tion in Arave was validated by the Supreme Court, while the con-
struction in Shell was deemed constitutionally infirm. Essentially,
the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" narrowing construction is "both
vague and unenlightening, ' 20 and therefore offers little (if any) gui-
dance to the sentencer.
C. GENUINE NARROWING
For similar reasons that the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" nar-
rowing construction in Arave does not sufficiently channel Idaho
sentencers' discretion, the narrowing construction fails genuinely to
narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Be-
cause the narrowing construction is vague insofar as it lacks objec-
tive criteria, it fails to reduce the number of offenders eligible for
the death penalty.
In both Lowenfield and Zant, the aggravating circumstances con-
sidered by the Court clearly narrowed the class of defendants eligi-
ble for the death penalty. In Lowenfield, the Court held that the
jury's finding that the defendant had "a specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person" met the re-
201 See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 769-70 (1990).
202 See supra notes 137-38, 142-45 and accompanying text.
203 Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1545 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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quirements of this prong of the Court's test.20 4 The Court con-
cluded that some individuals eligible for the death penalty would
not meet this standard and that therefore the class of death-eligible
offenders was genuinely limited.20 5 In Zant, the Court similarly
found that not every death-eligible offender either had a prior con-
viction for a capital offense or had escaped from lawful confinement.
Therefore, the aggravating circumstances in question limited the
number of individuals eligible for the death penalty.20 6
By contrast, the standardless narrowing construction in Arave
fails this prong of the test. The dissent correctly recognized that the
"cold-blooded pitiless slayer" construction fails to offer a standard
that "reasonably can be expected to be applied in a consistent and
meaningful way." 20 7 Because "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" defies
consistent definition, it can be applied to any death-eligible offender
and therefore fails genuinely to narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants.
D. ARAVE AND THE FUTURE
By validating a narrowing construction of an aggravating cir-
cumstance that was not itself sufficiently narrow, the United States
Supreme Court has taken a treacherous path that may lead to a sub-
version of its jurisprudence in the capital sentencing arena. A final
look at Shell bears this out.
In Shell, the Court held that Mississippi's narrowing construc-
tion of its aggravating circumstance insufficiently narrowed the sen-
tencer's discretion and therefore was unconstitutional. 208 Yet, if the
line of reasoning established in Arave had been applied in Shell, it is
likely that the Court would have determined that the Mississippi
courts had sufficiently narrowed Mississippi's "heinous, atrocious
and cruel" aggravating circumstance. After determining that the
narrowing construction was unconstitutionally broad, the Court
simply would have resorted to a dictionary to further narrow the
terms in question (as it did in Arave). As long as the Court was able
to locate a sufficiently narrow interpretation of Mississippi's narrow-
ing construction (that is, as long as the narrowing construction was
capable of constitutionally satisfactory limitation), the aggravating
circumstance would have survived.
204 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
205 Id.
206 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
207 Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1546 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208 Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 2 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring). See supra notes
63-65 and accompanying text.
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As this analysis indicates, following Arave, it is uncertain that a
state's capital sentencing scheme can be found invalid due to insuffi-
cient channeling of a sentencer's discretion. After all, what aggra-
vating circumstance or narrowing construction is not capable of a
narrow interpretation? By deviating from its mandate that a state's
courts adequately channel an unconstitutional aggravating circum-
stance, 20 9 the Supreme Court has raised doubts about the vitality of
its precedent requiring the voiding of state capital sentencing
schemes that do not adequately channel sentencers' discretion.
VI. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Arave v. Creech, the United States Supreme
Court has indicated a willingness to be extremely deferential to
states' capital sentencing schemes. In Arave, the Court validated a
scheme that was merely capable of being construed in a narrow way
instead of requiring that the state "channel the sentencer's discre-
tion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and de-
tailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death."210 Essentially, the Supreme Court
undercut its own precedent that required a state's capital sentencing
scheme both to adequately channel a sentencer's discretion in ad-
ministering the death penalty and to genuinely limit the number of
individuals eligible for the death penalty. By channeling Idaho's
own narrowing construction, the Court violated its own dictate that
a state must adequately channel its vague aggravating circum-
stance.211 In so doing, the Court allowed to stand an aggravating
circumstance that affords little or no guidance to a sentencer and
thus fails both prongs of the Court's test.212
The precedent set by this case is a dangerous one. The
Supreme Court has now expressed a willingness to attempt to de-
fine state court narrowing constructions of statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances. If the Court arrives at a sufficiently narrow definition, it
will allow the statute to stand, regardless of whether the definition it
arrived at was ever applied by the state itself. By so doing, the
Court has opened the door to the validation of capital sentencing
schemes that might defy definition by all but the Justices of the
Court.
DARYL KESSLER
209 See, e.g, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1989).
210 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (internal quotations omitted).
211 See, e.g., id.
212 See generally Olsen, supra note 188.
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